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The development of new energy storage technology must be heavily weighted to-
ward the application. The requirements for transitioning low risk technology into
operational space vehicles must remain the central theme even at the preliminary
development stages by the development of efforts to define operational issues and
verify the reliability of the system. Failure to follow a complete plan that re-
suits in a flight qualified unit may lead to an orphan technology. Development
efforts must be directed toward a stable development where changes in design are
evolutionary and end items are equivalent to flight units so that llfe and quali-
fication testing can be used as a vehicle to demonstrate the acceptability of the
technology.
INTRODUCTION
The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics promotes the development
and application of aircraft and aerospace technologies. We participate in the
formation of space policy by commenting on national plans and budgets through our
national umbrella technical committees. The technical committees of the AIAA are
the organizational units that deal with individual disciplines within the overall
structure. The Aerospace Power Systems Technical Committee (APSTC) promotes space
power interests through publications, policy support, and the support of the Inter-
society Energy Conversion Engineering Conference and other conferences. The level
of interaction with electrochemistry is at the user level in the area of space
power. While efforts at a more fundamental level are of interest, it is at the
lowest individual unit, e.g. the battery cell, solar cell, etc., that our interests
become well defined. It is the intent of this paper to describe some of the re-
quirements for the deployment of energy storage technology into operational (non-
experimental) power systems.
Even the most advantageous developments in energy storage technology are not
assured of adoption for use in space vehicles. Few space programs will adopt new
technology in the utility subsystems of.a space vehicle unless the risks are well
defined and acceptably small, and the actual mission of the program is either en-
abled by the use of the technology or the penalties in using older, established
technologies are severe. Clearly, "better" is insufficient for the adoption of new
technology. The success of space efforts when coupled with the conservatism
brought on by the tremendous costs of most space operations more often leads to
acceptance of reduced performance rather than accepting the risks associated with
new technology in the power subsystem. Furthermore, the high reliability and lon-




The environment for the adoption of new technology is unlikely to change when
the penalties for failure are severe. Any technology effort must therefore respond
to the conditions and requirements laid down by potential users if it is to be suc-
cessful. The requirements for adoption can then become a guide to assist in di-
recting research, development, testing, and transition to space applications.
These requirements also provide data for estimating the total cost and funding pro-
files.
The typical energy storage portion of an electrical power system, EPS, for a
space vehicle has a reliability requirement, i.e., an estimate of the probability
that it will provide for the specified performance of the mission for the specified
duration, greater than 0.97. After the reliabilities of necessary auxiliary hard-
ware such as cell interconnects, connectors, thermal control features, and mounting
fixtures in batteries, and, additionally, pumps, plumbing, and reactant storage in
fuel cells are deducted, the reliability requirement for an individual cell unit
can exceed 0.9999. Cell reliability requirements can be reduced somewhat if the
cell failure mode is a short, or bypass devices protect against open circuit fail-
ure without reducing the system reliability; the EPS must also be able to accept
lowered and varied delivery voltages from energy storage. Furthermore, the power
system and the space vehicle designers really expect more than a specified probabil-
ity of success. If failure or wear-out is to occur, the event should be predict-
able and non-catastrophlc. Failures should be soft so that operation can continue
at less than specified levels of performance after a component failure. These
requirements define both the quantity and quality of the information that must be
provided for any space-quallfied energy storage device.
The topic of discussion below is the mlnlmum unit development for secondary
(rechargeable) battery systems and regenerative fuel cells. This comprises the
cell in batteries, but might represent a cell stack in a fuel cell. While these
comments also might apply to primary (not recharged) cells, the long life
requirements of rechargeable or regenerable units makes development of flight
acceptable items both long-term and expensive. It is assumed here that a parallel
effort to design and develop the additional requirements for the "integrable"
assembly, the battery or the fuel cell unit including tankage, has been performed.
DISCUSSION
The basic, non-directed research aspects of the development of an energy stor-
age device constitute the smallest portion of the work necessary to bring the tech-
nology to fruition. Once a concept is defined and subjected to analysis, a de-
cision to proceed with development can be based on properties that include cost,
energy density, electrical characteristics, projected lifetime, development of
supporting devices and materials, environmental requirements, safety, and develop-
ment time. Comparison of new technology with the actual performance of current
state-of-the-art cells, as opposed to performance requirements in specifications,
will provide an indication of the value of proceeding with the development. Since
the real article is being compared with a "projected" technology, truly significant
improvements need to be projected. For instance, energy density improvements of
fifty percent can rapidly become insignificant as development proceeds. Actual




a concept has passed muster and proceeds into the various phases of devel-
it is imperative that preliminary failure modes and effects analyses
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(FMEA), and reliability analyses be performed. Key elements that impact reliabil-
ity and longevity should be defined. This is a development tool, not an adver-
tising tool, to demonstrate the level of progress that has been made. The objec-
tive is to develop a program to properly define and understand the weak points in
the technology. Research programs can then be designed to define the problems and
suggest corrective actions as well as the limits of the technology. Often those
problems that have the better defined solution receive the most attention while
more subtle, long term problems are shunted aside. Directed research on the tech-
nology that emphasizes the more subtle and longer term issues should be a contin-
uing effort that extends well into the final, life testing phase of the develop-
ment.
Periodic reviews of the technology to assess its current status in terms of
both development and directed research are critical. One must be assured that no
practically unsolvable show-stoppers are imbedded in the technology and that the
real advantages of the new technology over the state-of-the-art are verified at an
early stage. Updating technology comparisons is particularly important because the
performance of state-of-the-art technology generally improves while the projections
of performance for new technology generally decrease as development moves toward a
deliverable --^;--_ A _o,I_,_ _h,_ _ new _v_e_ w_11 only be competitive
or slightly better than the current state-of-the-art would indicate that the ulti-
mate development will be fruitless and should be cancelled.
Development prototype units permit the validation of the design and confirm-
ation of the FMEA. They should be subjected to straw man qualification testing and
abusive environments in order to define the limits of the deslgn(s) and the re-
sponse of the technology to extrema. These units should be used as guides and not
as advertising tools. The intentional or unintentional abusive testing and the
need to establish a learning curve for construction and operation of the units
limit the value of the operational data acquired from the first units. It is ques-
tioned whether preliminary development units should be placed in the data base to
establish fllght-worthlness. Similarly, poor results at this stage should not
bring about cancellation of the program unless the technology is found to be fund-
amentally flawed. Any difficulties with these cells skews the database with early
failures and slows the establishment of adequate reliability estimates. Similarly,
the premature testing of any unit in a way that implies that the results are repre-
sentative of the end item can be very detrimental.
The flight prototype manufacture occurs in the final stages of development and
signals the production of a qualified end item. Building on the design, manufac-
turing, and performance experience, design changes should by now have become an
evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. Future changes should be readily
correlated with the data base established with cells produced earlier. The docu-
mentation of the manufacturing and testing must be converted from development to
production. This generally involves increased definition of requirements, quality
monitoring, and a higher level of traceability. An end item FMEAmust be generated
using the data from both development and research to establish the operational con-
straints and inherent failure modes of the unit. A detailed performance descrip-
tion should be prepared that describes the performance limits of the item in terms
of projected lifetime, electrical capabilities, and environmental constraints. A
reliability analysis should be performed to provide assurance that the components
have an adequate reliability. However, energy storage devices are limited in reli-
ability by complex chemical and physical interactions within the device and not,
typically, by individual component reliability. The reliability and long term per-
formance must be demonstrated before it will be accepted for operational vehicles.
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This is a time consuming and expensive process that requires planning and commit-
ment at the onset of the development program.
The construction and testing of a complete integrable assembly and life testing
in some form are required to demonstrate reliability and long term performance.
The verification of the integrable unit, the battery or fuel cell assembly, can be
by either a ground test or flight test. Environmental testing and proper simula-
tion during life testing generally suffice to demonstrate operation in space for
the individual Cells. The cell unit is sealed and a space environment should not
change the operation of the unit appreciably. Operation cannot depend on gravity
or atmospheric pressure; this should have been demonstrated during the preliminary
development and design phases. Battery or fuel cell assemblies require experience
in integration into spacecraft and demonstration that the new assembly will operate
compatibly with its own and other subsystems. Flight testing provides a "warm
feeling" but the integration and testing activity is the most valuable portion.
Typically, performance data from flight experiments are poorer in quality and
limited in range than that acquired on the ground and it is certainly the more
expensive to acquire. An additional problem with demonstration flight testing in
the future is the trend toward increasing sizes of energy storage flight units. A
flight test of a unit sized to provide 5 kW or more is impractical on most test
flights and few programs will risk an entire mission on an unproven energy storage
unit. The option then is to flight test a scale model, e.g. 250 to 500 W, or to
perform ground tests only.
The requirements of the life testing are to provide long term performance and
reliability data, to verify acceptable means of controlling charge and discharge of
the units, and to demonstrate an acceptable environmental range for operation. In
order to provide statistically significant data, a large number of units must be
tested under conditions that adequately simulate actual use. A sufficient number
should be subjected to representative qualification level environmental testing to
provide assurance that no long term effect exists. The number of units that should
be life tested depends on the variations in design and the range of conditions
desired. The number of test units can also be traded with the duration of the
test; fewer units can be tested for a longer period to demonstrate an arbitrary
reliability and confidence level for a specified mission duration. A generic life
test of new technology should provide a data base that supports reliability esti-
mates and conditions of operation for appropriate applications. The actual relia-
bility estimates for a specific application will also require mission-specific life
testing. Thus a generic life test must have as a goal providing a sufficient data
base that will result in establishing an acceptable reliability and confidence
level when it is combined with all other available data.
Life testing must be performed within an assured performance envelope. New
technology must demonstrate significant performance improvements over existing
technology. However, testing new technology at levels near extremities of perform-
ance can result in failure of the units and severe delays in the adoption of the
technology. A life test should demonstrate the superiority of the technology, but
should not risk failure by overtesting. In addition to demonstrating the advan-
tages of the new technology and establishing a data base, another important aspect
of a life testing is the promotion of the technology. It should not explore per-
formance limits.
If the technology were to be adopted for a mission at the beginning of the life
testing, the probability of success should be quite high, even if relatively unde-
fined. The life test objective is to demonstrate that the existing design(s) are
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highly reliable and acceptable for routine use. The risk in acting on this presump-
tion prior to verification is that long term performance problems will only surface
later in the mission. Additionally, the management of the assembly on orbit
(charge, discharge, and maintenance) may not have been adequately evaluated. These
risks are greatest when the new technology is similar to the existing state-of-the-
art because the tendency is to assume that the same techniques and procedures can
be used on both technologies. A more subtle problem with premature use of the
technology is that it will be applied at levels significantly less than its capa-
bility in order to mitigate the risk. This then creates a baseline for use that
will only slowly change with time (mission experience uber alles) where the tech-
nology shows only modest apparent gains over previous technology rather than the
level of performance demonstrated in llfe testing.
As the life testing proceeds successfully and the continuing research further
defines the limits of operation and application, the technology can be applied at
levels that are nearer the operational limits. Development is then complete and
the technology can be used whenever it is required.
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